Ko v. State, 1993-1997

Child acknowledged after birth acquires nationality through birth

By William Wetherall

First posted 1 July 2009
Last updated 21 June 2014

Overview Origins • Ruling • Chronology • Quality of opinions • Quality of translations • Sources, presentation, commentary
Judgment Particulars • Findings • Summary • Relevant laws • Main text • Supplementary opinion • Justices

Overview of Ko v. State, 1993-1997

On 17 October 1997, the Second Petit Bench of the Supreme Court of Japan handed down a very interesting judgment in a case that required the court to determine whether a Japanese man's acknowledgement of a child after its birth satisfied a provision in the Nationality Law which stipulated at time of birth.

The court ruled that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, in which it was legally impossible for the father to acknowledge the child before its birth, it was reasonable to conclude that the father had complied with the spirit of the law if not necessarily with its letter. Therefore, the child was Japanese.

Ko as child of Otsu and Tei

I am calling this case "Ko v. State" because the received public copy of the judgment calls the child "Kō" (甲) or "A" in conformity with the convention of referring to parties as 甲乙丙丁 (kō, otsu, hei, tei) et cetera, meaning A, B, C, D and so forth. Ko's mother is called "Otsu" (乙) or "B", the mother's husband at the time of Ko's birth is called "Hei" (丙) or "C", and Ko's father is called "Tei" (丁) or "D".

The received English translation refers to the mother as "A" -- the child as "P" -- the mother's husband as "B" -- and the child's father as "C" (but once as "Y").

Chuo University law professor Okuda Yasuhiro, in his transcription of the Supreme Court ruling in Ko v. State, more logically calls the mother "A" -- the child plaintiff/appellant/appellee "X" -- the woman's husband "B" -- and the child's father "C" (Okuda 2010, pages 181-184).

Since the Supreme Court was hearing a case which the State had appealed to the court after receiving an unfavorable ruling from the Tokyo High Court, the judgment also refers to Ko (甲 Kō) as the 被上告人 (hi-jōkokunin) or "[jokoku] appellee" whereas the State (国 Kuni) is called the 上告人 (jōkokunin) or "[jokoku] appellant.

Ko's mother is described as a 韓国人 (Kankokujin), meaning a national of the Republic of Korea. The mother, while called "Otsu" in the summary of the judgement, is called ★仙和 or "★ Senwa" in the main text. "Senwa" is the Sino-Japanese reading of the name. The Sino-Korean reading would be Sŏnhwa (McCune-Reischauer). Another received text says ※（外字）仙和 meaning "※ (character outside [standard set of characters]) Senwa".

The web-published version names Otsu's Japanese husband (篠瀬幸夫 Shinose Yukio / Sachio) and Ko's Japanese father (吉野博昭 Yoshino Hiroaki). So would appear that it was not trying to hide the identities of the adults in Ko's life -- unless these names were fictitious.

The received English translation of the main text of the judgment, however, suppresses all these names. Senwa becomes "A" (should be "B"), Shinose becomes "B" (should be "C"), and Yoshino becomes "C" (should be "D") -- but curiously, Yoshino is once called "Y" -- the only vestige of the names in the Japanese text.

Note that the current (2014) version of the ruling posted by the Japanese government suppresses all personal names except those of the prosecutors representing the State and the justices who rendered the judgment.

The complications of acknowledgement

Ko was born to Otsu, an ROK national Korean woman married to Hei, a Japanese man, but Ko's father was Tei, another Japanese man. Ko's father was not legally allowed to recognize Ko as his because Ko's mother was married to Hei. However, Otsu and Hei divorced two months after Ko's birth, and three weeks later Ko's parents initiated family court proceedings to confirm that there was no parent-child relationship between Ko and Otsu's ex-husband Hei. Only then could Ko's father, Tei, establish a parental relationship through acknowledgement.

A few months later, the family court confirmed that there was no parent-child relationship between Ko and Hei. The judgement came into effect a few days later, and within 2 weeks Tei filed a notification of acknowledgment, apparently thinking that Ko would be entered in his family register as his child, and that Ko's status in the register would show that Ko was Japanese from birth.

In other words, it appears that Tei expected his acknowledgement of Ko to be effective retroactively -- pursuant to Article 2, Item 1 of the Nationality Law, which provides that a child shall be a Japanese national through birth "When, at the time of its birth, the father or the mother is a Japanese national".

Parent-child relationship

That Ko's mother was an alien somewhat complicated the problem of acquiring Japanese nationality through birth. Had Otsu not been married, Ko's Japanese father could have had Ko entered in his family register at the time of Ko's birth, through acknowledgement either before or at the time of birth. Because Otsu was married, though, Ko's father could not legally acknowledge his paternity until (1) after Ko was born, and (2) after a family court confirmed that there was no relationship between Ko and Otsu's ex-husband Hei.

Ordinarily, because Otsu's husband was Japanese, she and Tei could have registered Ko in Tei's register as his in-wedlock child, in which case Ko would have been Japanese from the time of birth. Apparently she didn't wish to -- or couldn't, for any number of reason -- hide Ko's paternity from Hei. Most likely she and Hei were already estranged, and Tei had already agreed to acknowledge Ko as his child.

Tei, however, was not allowed to acknowledge that he was the father of a child of a woman married to another man. Even if Otsu and Hei had divorced before Ko's birth, had Ko been born within 300 days of the divorce, registrars would consider Ko to have been Hei's child.

Child's status until Supreme Court decision

If Hei had acknowledged Ko as his child, Ko would have been a Japanese national from birth. But since he didn't, Registrars had no recourse but to treat Ko as an alien born in Japan. Under the circumstances, his alien nationality hinged on his mother's home country law -- which meant the Republic of Korea. But ROK's Nationality law at the time was still patrilineal in the case of a married ROK national woman.

What, then, was Ko's status until the Supreme Court ruled that Ko qualified for Japanese nationality retroactive to birth? The ruling does touch upon such matters -- for the simple reason that they are irrelevant. Ko's case was a "request for confirmation of nationality" -- meaning Japanese nationality -- and the only issue was whether Ko qualified for birthright Japanese nationality pursuant to his father's acknowledgement -- a tricky issue, since Tei had not legally been Ko's father at the time Ko was born.

However, Ko's status is worth speculation.

Ko obviously did not have Japanese nationality in the eyes of the Japanese government at the time Ko's parents resorted to litigation to confirm Ko's possession of birthright Japanese nationality. And it would appear that Ko didn't qualify for ROK nationality through Otsu, since ROK's Nationality Law was not yet matrilineal.

ROK's nationality law did not become ambilineal like Japan's until 1998. The ROK law in effect at the time was patrilineal in essentially the same manner that Japan's 1950 law had been until it became ambilineal from 1985.

ROK's Nationality Law, like Japan's law before 1985, had a provision for matrilineal birthright nationality should Otsu's alien (i.e., non-ROK national) husband Hei have been stateless, But Hei was Japanese. Had Otsu and Hei divorced before Ko was born, Otsu might have been able to claim ROK nationality for Ko matrilineally, by representing Ko as having been born out-of-wedlock.

I would guess, then, that Otsu had no choice but to notify Ko's birth as that of an alien born in Japan, and to complete alien registration procedures. And because she was unable to acquire a nationality for Ko, Ko became legally stateless.

Note that Ko did not need to have a legal status in order to be a litigant. A child or an adult who appears to be totally unregistered can be represented in a Japanese court.

Neither my daughter nor my son were registered when they became plaintiffs in separate nationality confirmation cases in 1978 and 1982. They were not registered -- i.e., they did not legally exist in Japan -- until 1983, after I had been found guilty by a regional summary court on two counts of violating the Alien Registration Law. It was my contention that they should not be treated as aliens until a final court of appeal had rejected their claim that they were Japanese through birth.

I cannot help but think that Ko's parents felt the same way -- but perhaps they were less inclined than I was to resort to civil disobediance.

On the surface

Again, the Supreme Court decision does not touch on such particulars -- but apparently, when Ko's father filed a notification of acknowledgement, the municipal registrar, guided by the Ministry of Justice, refused to apply the birthright provision for Japanese nationality in Article 2, Item 1 of the Nationality Law, which states that a child shall be a Japanese national through birth "When, at the time of its birth, the father or the mother is a Japanese national".

The issue here is whether a parent-child relationship existed between Ko and Tei at the time of Ko's birth. On the surface, it didn't. On the surface, what existed at the time of Ko's birth was a presumed parent-child relationship between Ko and Ko's mother's husband Hei. The presumed relationship between Ko and Hei was not found to have never existed until a few months after Ko's birth. And Ko's father Tei was unable to acknowledge his paternity until after the presumed relationship was found not to exist.

The Ministry of Justice, guided by the timing of the flow of these legal events, regarded the legal relationship between Ko and Tei to have started from the day Tei's acknowledgement of Ko was accepted. In other words, according to the paper trail -- the trail of official documents -- Tei was not legally Ko's father at the time of Ko's birth. Ergo, Article 2, Item 1 of the Nationality Law did not apply.

Moreover, Article 3 of the Nationality Law -- as introduced from 1985 -- had no provision for retroactive acknowledgment. And until Article 3 was revised from 2009, paternal or maternal acknowledgement by a Japanese parent of an alien child would qualify the child for Japanese nationality only if the acknowledging parents were married -- i.e., only if the child was legitimated -- and the child would acquire Japanese nationality from the day its parents filed a notification of acquisition based on both the acknowledgement and the legitimation.

Two out of three courts begged to differ

On the surface, the State's position sounded reasonable. The Tokyo District Court bought the Ministry of Justice's argument. The Tokyo High Court, however, ruled in favor of Ko, and the State appealed to the Supreme Court. And the Supreme Court also ruled in favor of Ko.

The Supreme Court found that registrars, guided by the Ministry of Justice, did not take into account the manner in which the law itself prevented Ko's father from acknowledging his paternity in a timely manner -- i.e., before or at the time of Ko's birth. The government also failed to consider that Tei, when finally he was able to legally acknowledge Ko, did so without delay. Ergo, in the eyes of the court, Ko should be treated as though Tei had acknowledged his child at the time of its birth.

What mattered most to the court, then, was the father's intent to acknowledge the child -- before or at the time of its birth -- and the actions he took when possible to do so.

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Origins of case

Ko v. State originated in a dispute over the interpretation of the phrase 出生の時 (shussei no toki) or "at time of birth" in Article 2 of the 1950 Nationality Law. The Article was revised from 1985, but the critical "at time of birth" phrasing remained unchanged from the original 1899 Nationality Law.

Article 2

Article 2 of the Nationality Law as revised from 1985 stated that a child qualified for acquisition of Japanese nationality through birth, if (1) one of the child's parents was Japanese at the time of its birth, (2) the child's father, if deceased prior to its birth, was Japanese at the time of his death, or (3) the child was born in Japan to parents both of whom are either unknown or stateless.

In conjunction with family law provisions in the Civil Code, Article 2 implies that any child of a Japanese woman will qualify for acquisition of Japanese nationality through birth, since family law customarily regards a woman's delivery of a child as evidence of her maternal acknowledgement. Whereas the Nationality Law had been primarily patrilineal until 1984, since 1985 it has been primarily ambilineal.

Japanese family law also regards any child born to a woman in wedlock to be her husband's -- except when the child is born within 300 days of the woman's divorce from another man, in which case the former husband will be considered the father. These conventions have become highly controversial in an age when DNA and other tests can easily determine, or at least rule out, paternity, but this was not the central issue in Ko v. State.

Article 3

Article 3, as newly introduced in the Nationality Law from 1985, stipulated that a child could acquire Japanese nationality through acknowledgement by a Japanese parent after its birth, so long as its parents had married in order to legitimate the child. Acknowledgement alone was insufficient. Moreover, notifications for acquisition had to be filed before the child turned 20 years of age. Typically, if not always, the mother of such a child was an alien and the father was a Japanese.

The plaintiff in Ko v. State, however, was not seeking nationality through Article 3 -- which, in any event, would not have applied, since Ko's father and mother were not married. Even had they eventually married, the object of the litigation was to establish Ko's acquisition of Japanese nationality through birth (Article 2) from the time of birth -- not through recognition and legitimation (Article 3), which did not have retroactive effects.

A 2008 Supreme Court ruled the legitimacy condition unconstitutional. The Diet revised Article 3 by deleting the legitimacy condition, and the revised article, which now requires only acknowledgement, and transitional measures that provide for retroactive application of the revision, came into force from 2009. See both Filipinos v. State, 2003-2008 and 2009 Nationality Law revisions for further details.

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Ruling in case

The Supreme Court ruled that Ko's father could not have effected an acceptable acknowledgement of Ko until a few months after Ko's birth -- but because he had done so at the earliest legal opportunity, the acknowledgement should have the same effect as it would have if it had been acceptable when the father attempted to acknowledge Ko before birth.

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Chronology of case

Ko v. State actually began in a family court, but the family court addressed only the question of whether or not Ko's father could have been the man to whom her mother was married when Ko was born. The family court recognized that the mother's by then former husband was not Ko's father.

The series of rulings which ended with the Supreme Court's decision in 1997 are as follows.

First instance court (1993-1994)

Court:     Tokyo District Court
Case:      Heisei 5 (Gyo-U) 349
Litigants: Ko v. State
Judgment:  28 September 1994
Ruling:    Ko is not Japanese

Second instance court (1994-1995)

Court:     Tokyo High Court
Case:      Heisei 6 (Gyo-Ko) 195
Litigants: Ko v. State (Ko appeals)
Judgment:  29 November 1995
Ruling:    Ko is Japanese from birth

Final court of appeal (1996-1997)

Court:     Supreme Court, Second Petit Bench
Case:      Heisei 8 (Gyo-Tsu) 60
Litigants: State v Ko (State appeals)
Judgment:  17 October 1997
Ruling:    Ko is Japanese from birth

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Quality of opinions

The judgment in this case is a wonderful example of the capacity of the Supreme Court to favor the spirit of a law over its literal interpretation. The judgment came down to the quality of what I would call the acknowledging father's MO.

The father's motives were judged to be have satisfied the intent of the law as he had attempted to comply with its requirement for paternal acknowledgement at the earliest opportunity. In other words, the timeliness of his acknowledgement was measured -- not by the date of his acknowledgement in relation to his child's birth -- but by his sincerity in attempting to acknowledge his child at the earliest legal opportunity.

Supplementary opinion

The supplementary opinion, too, closely argues that there is more to law than meets the eye takes a phrase like "at time of birth" too literally. According to the opinion, Reply No. 7608 of the Second Division of the Civil Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice, made by the bureau's director on 18 December 1982 (民二第七六〇八号法務省民事局長回答), presumably in response to a query from a local municipal registrar, held that a late acknowledgement by the Japaneses father of a child born to an ROK national could acquire Japanese nationality under Item 1 of Article 2 of the Nationality Law.

Civil Affairs Bureau Director-General Notice No. 7608 of 18 December 1982

In 1982, the Second Division of the Civil Affairs Bureau, which covers nationality and registration, replied to a query from a municipal registrar as to how to deal with a certain case of an ROK Korean woman who had been married to an ROK Korean man but divorced him during her pregnancy. The Japanese father filed a notification of acknowledgement about 3 months after the divorce but before the child was born, and the notification was provisionally accepted because it was not yet possible to presume that the child was the legitimate child of the woman's ex-husband. As the child was born within 300 days of the divorce, however, the ex-husband became its presumptive father, and the registrar, guided by the Ministry of Justice, held that the acknowledgement would not have legal effect until a family court ruled that there was no parent-child relationship between the ex-husband and the child. When the parents obtained such a ruling, the father's acknowledgment had effect from the time of the child's birth, hence it qualified for birthright Japanese nationality and was duly entered in his father's family register.

The supplementary opinion cited this as an example of how registrars, guided by the Ministry of Justice, treat essentially the same case differently -- which, it held, was not desirable. Ko deserved to be treated in the same way, in that as an effect of the family court ruling that Ko's mother's ex-husband had not been Ko's father, Ko should be regarded as having been born out of wedlock the child of the Japanese man who had recognized Ko, effective at the time of birth, hence Ko also qualified for birthright Japanese nationality. In other words, it was not simply a matter of literally "at time of birth" but a question of intent and effort to effect an acknowledgement of a fetus before birth.

Civil Affairs Bureau Director-General Notice No. 180 of 30 January 1998

On 30 January 1998, three months or so after the Supreme Court's Decision in Ko v. State, the Civil Affairs Bureau director, issued Notice No. 180 representing the bureau's Fifth Division (平成10年1月30日民五第180号民事局長通達), "Concerning children who are subject to presumption of being the wedlock issue of the husband [whether alien or Japanese] of an alien mother, and concerning the possession or not of Japan's [Japanese] nationality in cases where there has been a notification of acknowledgement from a Japanese man" (外国人母の夫の嫡出推定を受ける子について、日本人男から認知の届出があった場合の日本国籍の有無について). The object of this notice was to provide guidance to local registrars who encounter such cases, in compliance with the 17 October 1997 Supreme Court ruling in Ko v. State. (Okuda 2010, pages 187-189)

Civil Affairs Bureau Director-General Notice No. 2420 of 11 November 1999

On 11 November 1999 (Heisei 11-11-11), the heads of the Second Division and Fifth Division of the Civil Affairs Bureau issued Notice No. 2420 (平成11年11月11日民二・民五第2420号民事局第二課長、第五課長通知) "Concerning the treatment et cetera of extra-liaisonal [i.e., international private law related] fetal acknowledgements" (渉外的胎児認知届の取扱い等について). This notice, referring to the 1998 notice, and to the 1997 Supreme Court ruling, gives even more general guidance regarding embryo recognition -- referring not only to the above-mentioned 18 December 1982 Reply (No. 7608), but also to 20 March 1918 Reply No. 364 (大正7年3月20日付け民第364号法務局長回答), which similarly held that a child born to an alien woman, if recognized when a fetus, after the woman had divorced, would be treated as having acquired Japanese nationality, without regard to the time of the notification. (Okuda 2010, pages 190-192)

Civil Affairs Bureau Director-General Notice No. 2030 of 18 July 2003

On 18 July 2003 (Heisei 15-07-18) the Civil Affairs Bureau issued a notice concerning a Supreme Court judgement in the nationality confirmation case of a child born to an ROK Korean woman who had remarried a Japanese man after divorcing another Japanese man. The woman had separated from her husband, and had a divorce notification with his seal on it. but when she tried to contact him to confirm his final wish, she was unable to find him. After that, she became acquainted with another Japanese man, and she gave birth to a child -- the plaintiff in the nationality confirmation case -- 1 day after finally submitting the divorce notification. Some 8 months later the couple petitioned a family court for mediation in determining that a parent-child relationship did not exist between their child and the woman's former husband. And 4 days after the family court ruled that such a relationship didn't exist, the child's father acknowledged his paternity. The Osaka District Court accepted the child's claim (2000), but the Osaka High Court nullified the district court's ruling and dismissed the claim (2000). Then on 12 June 2003, the First Petit Bench of the Supreme Court dismissed the high court's decision and accepted the child's claim to be a Japanese national. In this case, too, the Supreme Court totally rejected the Ministry of Justice's position that, while it is desire able for a Japanese father to recognize a child he sires with an alien woman, under Article 3, the child should not qualify for Japanese nationality unless the couple legitimate the child through marriage. This notice somewhat revised Notice 180 of 1998. (Okuda 2010, pages 194-195)

"at the time of its birth"

The judgment in Ko v. State is a good example of how at times courts -- taking both human and legal factors into consideration -- have stretched the meanings of controlling phrases in Japanese laws beyond the limits that legal bureaucrats have conventionally imposed on the phrases -- in this case the "at the time of its birth" criterion in the Nationality Law.

As the Supreme Court ruling shows, the law does not define the phrase "at the time of its birth" but leaves its interpretation to registrars and the Ministry of Justice. The writers of the supplementary opinion wonder whether it is a good idea to leave such interpretation to whim, but conclude that this is something for the legislature to ponder.

In the meantime, registrars -- and the legal bureaucrats who guide them -- need to take the circumstances of each case into account, and to consider the intent of those responsible for filing notifications in a timely manner. Parents should not be held responsibility for delays caused by the law itself and/or its administration -- such as those which prevented the father in Ko v. State from recognizing the child when he first attempted attempted.

Above all, there needs to be more consistency in how registrars treat people in similar circumstances. Apart from its importance as an argument for considering the spirit as well as the letter of the law, the most important contribution of the 1997 Ko v. State ruling -- especially the supplementary opinion -- is to point out and condemn the arbitrariness that characterizes some government efforts to enforce Japan's laws.

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Quality of translations

Like most received English versions of court decisions in Japan, this one captures the general drift of the decision but misrepresents some of the key terms and phrases as metaphors in Japanese law. Here are some examples.

Republic of Korea

Ko's mother Otsu is described as a 韓国人 (Kankokujin), which means she was a national of the Republic of Korea -- not merely a "Korean".

While people writing in English may be inclined to conflate 韓国人 (Kankokujin) and 朝鮮人 (Chōsenjin), the two statuses are different, and courts do not speak of individuals in the manner of 韓国・朝鮮人 (Kankoku・Chōsenjin) or コリアン (Korian). There are, in fact, more than two legal classifications in Japanese that, in English, are typically and, with considerable loss of meaning, reduced to simply "Korean".

Family Register

Contrary to the received translation, a "koseki" (戸籍) is a "family (household) register" -- not a "Civil Register Status". Family registers are governed by the "Kosekihō" (戸籍法) or "Family Register Law" -- not the "Law on Civil Status".

"Civil status" -- such as it legally exists in Japan -- is defined by at least two kinds of registers, which vary in type according to whether one is a Japanese national or an alien, and according to the period under consideration. The basic elements of individual status include name, date of birth (age), sex, nationality, residential status (where one legally resides), and possibly family relationship such as parent, child, or spouse.

See Civil status and registers: Honseki, residence, and polity affiliation in Japan for a table showing the relationships between various kinds of civil registers in Japan and legal status.

Quality of received translation

It is nice to see important Japanese court rulings made available in English. It would be nicer, though, if the English versions reflected the precision of the Japanese texts. While most translations are done by people familiar with Japanese laws, the translators are not necessarily careful about mapping essential phrases accurately. General meanings usually survive, but the finer nuances of the original text -- its phrasing and usage, its logic -- tend to be lost in freer approaches.

My "structural translations" here are not polished, but they could easily be polished with little loss of the results of my efforts to map key expressions -- key phrases, key words -- identically throughout, cutting as close to the linguistic bone of Japanese legal express as possible. Here is an example.

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Sources, presentation, and commentary

Sources

Received Japanese text of ruling

The Japanese text was extracted from a pdf file downloaded from the database accessible through the Japanese government's 裁判所 Courts in Japan website. Most case particulars and a summary were retrieved by a query using minimum case particulars. These particulars and the summary are also shown.

Received English translation

The English version was extracted from an html file retrieved by a query in the English section of the same 裁判所 Courts in Japan website. A note at the bottom states that the English version as "Translated by Sir Ernest Satow Chair of Japanese Law, University of London" -- which would seem to be Hiroshi Oda (小田博 Oda Hiroshi), who has has been the Sir Ernest Satow Professor of Japanese Law at the University of London, University College, since 1990. Oda is the author of Japanese Law, first published by Butterworths in 1993. Oxford University Press brought out a revised 2nd edition in 1999 and further revised 3rd edition in 2009.

Structural English translation

Because parts of the received translation do not accurately reflect the finer details and texture of the language of the Japanese ruling, I have occasionally shown structural translations of parts that are of special interest to me.

Formatting, commentary, and markup

I have divided the judgment into sections, and have somewhat reformatted the received texts and highlighted some words and phrases to facilitate analysis and commentary.

Underscoring

All underscoring in the text of the judgment is as received. Unless otherwise noted, the underscoring of corresponding parts of the received translation is mine. All underscoring in my own commentary is, of course, also mine.

Parentheses

Unless otherwise noted, all (parentheses) in the received text and translation are as received.

Square and angle brackets

All in-line [square brackets] and <angle brackets> -- and everything enclosed in such brackets -- are mine.

Structural translations and commentary

My own closer (structural) translations are generally shown in blue in cells below the received judgment and received translation. At times I have shown closer translations of words or short phrases in-line, between right and left → arrows ← following the amended text.

Editorial [clarifications] are shown in-line. Brief comments are sometimes boxed in the cells of the texts they relate to. Extended comments are generally shown in cells below the relevant texts.

Color highlighting

The received texts of the judgment and translation, and my own commentary, are shown in black. However, to facilitate commentary on the language of the ruling and/or its translation, I have highlighted specific words and phrases in various colors according to the following scheme, which includes in-line editorial clarifications and corrections.

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裁判長裁判官　河合　伸一
      裁判官　大西　勝也
      裁判官　根岸　重治
      裁判官　福田　　博

Presiding Judge Justice KAWAI Shinichi
                Justice ONISHI Katsuya
                Justice NEGISHI Shigeharu
                Justice FUKUDA Hiroshi

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